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Abstract 
 
 
The Many Worlds Interpretation (MWI) famously avoids the issue of wave function 
collapse.  Different MWI trees representing the same quantum events can have 
different topologies, depending upon the observer.  However, they are all isomorphic 
to the group of block universes containing all of the outcomes of all of the events, and 
so, in that sense, the group of block universes is a more fundamental representation.  
Different branches of the MWI tree, representing different universes in MWI, 
ultimately share the same quantum state in a common “ancestor” branch.  This 
branching topology is incompatible with that of the Minkowski block universe; the 
resolution is to replace the branches with discrete, parallel block universes, each of 
which extends from the trunk to the outermost twigs.  The number of universes in a 
branch is proportional to its thickness which, in turn, depends upon the absolute 
square of the probability amplitude for the state in that branch.  Every quantum event 
may be represented by a “kernel” of universes, which is the smallest group of 
universes that will reproduce the quantum probabilities of the outcomes of that event.  
By considering the ratios of the probabilities of the outcomes of any event, it can be 
shown that the number of universes in every kernel must finite, as must be the total 
number of universes in the multiverse.  Further, every universe in the multiverse must 
be finite both in space and time.  Another consequence is that quantum probabilities 
must be rational, which suggests that quantum mechanics is only an approximation to 
a discrete theory.  A corollary is that not every conceivable universe exists in the 
multiverse, no doubt to the disappointment of those who enjoy alternate-history 
novels. 
 
 
1. “Splitting” in the Many Worlds Interpretation 
 
In spite of the advice of his doctoral thesis advisor, John Archibald Wheeler, to 
remove the loaded references to “splitting” from the draft of his PhD thesis, Hugh 
Everett III managed to retain one mention of the word, in the context of the observer, 
in the finished work: 
 
“As soon as the observation is performed, the composite state is split into 
a superposition for which each element describes a different object-system 
state and an observer with (different) knowledge of it.” [1] 
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Everett famously introduced the concept of the Many Worlds Interpretation (MWI) in 
order avoid the difficulty of wave-function collapse.  The splitting envisaged by 
Everett is illustrated in Figure 1, which shows a few branches of the vast tree 
generated by the unitary evolution of the wave function of the whole universe. 
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Figure 1:  A MWI tree with three quantum events, A, B, and C.  The outcomes 
of each of these events are indicated by the corresponding letter, numbered by a 
subscript. 
 
 
Three quantum events are shown in the figure, labelled A, B and C.  Sometimes in 
this paper we shall call these events “experiments” in the cause of tradition, and the 
environment in which the result of each experiment decoheres will be called the 
“Observer” (which may be just an interacting electron, not a sentient being!).  The 
outcome of each experiment is labelled by a subscript.  So, for instance, the outcome 
of experiment A may be either A1 or A2. 
 
Possible sequences of events are implicit in the figure.  For example, outcome A2 is 
followed by outcome C1, which, in turn, is followed by outcome B1.  Eight different 
sequences are represented in the tree, and these are shown schematically in Figure 2.  
Each of the eight possibilities is drawn within a Minkowski block universe.  Alice, 
Bob and Cleo conduct the experiments A, B and C respectively. 
The sequence A2, C1, B1 mentioned above is contained in universe (2), and inspection 
of Figure 1 will confirm that the remaining seven sequences are also each represented 
in Figure 2.  The numbers in brackets at the ends of the branches (the “twigs”) in 
Figure 1 correspond to the universes listed in Figure 2.  So, in a sense, the MWI tree 
in Figure 1 is isomorphic with the collection of block universes in Figure 2.  Notice 
that experiment C is conditional on the outcome of experiment A being A2 and not A1, 
which is why Cleo does not appear in universes (1) or (5).  (For the sake of generality, 
three branches, and not two, emerge from event C.) 
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A feature of MWI trees is that they may be drawn from the perspective of a particular 
Observer.  The tree in Figure 1 captures Alice’s experience.  We suppose that Bob is 
sufficiently far from Alice, spatially, that she sees the result of the experiment 
performed by Cleo, who is spatially close to her, before Bob’s light-cone can reach 
her. 
C
1
C
2 C3
C1 C2 C3
Α
1 Β1 Α2 Β1 Α2 Β1 Β1Α2
Α
1 Β2 Α2 Β2 Α2 Β2 Α2 Β2
(1)                             (2)                             (3)                            (4)
(5)                             (6)                             (7)                            (8)
 
Figure 2:  The eight possible outcomes of experiments A, B and C are shown in 
Minkowski block universes.  Event C is conditional on the outcome of A being A2. 
 
Notice that Figure 1 features the same experiment B four times.  If the tree had been 
drawn from Bob’s perspective instead of Alice’s, experiment B would only be seen 
once, but A and C would each appear twice – see Figure 3. 
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Figure 3:  The same MWI tree as in Figure 1 but drawn from Bob’s perspective. 
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Again, inspection of this figure will confirm that it contains all of the experimental 
sequences in Figure 1 – as seen in this case from Bob’s perspective – and that, once 
more, it is isomorphic with respect to the eight possible sequences of outcomes of the 
three events in the collection of block universes in Figure 2.  As before, the ends of 
the branches are labelled with the numbers in brackets that correspond to the eight 
possibilities in Figure 2. 
 
Since the different perspectives of the MWI tree are isomorphic to the same collection 
of block universes, the latter may, in a sense, be regarded as a more fundamental 
representation.  We shall return to this point in the next section. 
 
Figure 4 shows the quantum states for a sample of the branches in Figure 1.  The 
probability amplitude for each experimental outcome is indicated by the 
corresponding subscripted lower-case letter.  So, for instance, the probability 
amplitudes for outcomes A1 and A2 of experiment A are a1 and a2 respectively.  The 
state of the Observer is contained in its own subscript.  Hence, for instance, 
211 ACB
Obs is an Observer (an environment) that has witnessed (decohered with) 
experimental outcomes A2, C1 and B1 in the three experiments. 
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Figure 4:  Quantum states for some branches.  The components of each quantum 
state include states of outcomes of experiments in the ancestor branches 
multiplied by the corresponding probability amplitudes in lower-case letters.  
The subscripts of an environment – or Observer – state show the history that it 
has experienced. 
 
 
The states of the twigs sprouting from the higher branches inevitably incorporate the 
history of all of their “ancestor” states.  So, for instance, the two twigs labelled (2) 
and (6) that emerge from the B experiment each carry the imprint of the preceding C 
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and Α experiments, namely, 
21AC2121
ObsAC ⊗⊗ac , while differing only in the 
two outcomes for the B experiment. 
 
Regardless of Wheeler’s nervousness over the “splitting” term, the provenance of 
each Observer’s experience is clear from the diagram: each of the two different 
Observers, 
211 ACB
Obs  and
212 ACB
Obs , in the two B branches shares the same 
ancestor, 
21AC
Obs , in the C1 branch of the C experiment. 
 
2. Reconciling the topologies of MWI and the block universe 
 
The topology of this characteristic splitting is not allowed by the block-universe view 
of Minkowski space.  Of course, the concept of a block universe is still challenged by 
some physicists (see discussion in [2]) but that is a debate for a different forum: the 
purpose of this paper is to work out the implications of a Many-Worlds picture that is 
compatible with block universes. 
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Figure 5:  The MWI tree may be regarded as comprising many parallel 
filaments, each being a block universe.  Three block universes are drawn as 
thick dark-grey lines. 
 
 
Figure 5 illustrates how the topologies may be reconciled.  Three indicative parallel 
block universes are shown, one being block universe (2) and two being block universe 
(6), as shown in Figure 2. 
 
In the MWI the Observers in the (2) and (6) branches shared the same ancestor 
branch, 
21AC2121
ObsAC ⊗⊗ac , containing the previous experiments, C1 and 
A2.  However, in Figure 5 the three Observers’ experiences of these previous 
experiments are identical but separate, because there is a copy of that branch, each 
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with its own copy of the Observer
21AC
Obs , in each of the separate, discrete block 
universes.  It is, perhaps, fitting that the resolution of the topology problem is solved 
by using a collection of parallel block universes which, as we noted in the previous 
section, is, in a sense, a more fundamental representation than the tree, since it is 
unchanged by an observer’s perspective. 
 
It will be useful to ask the question: how many parallel universes are there in the 
multiverse?  In the MWI, the weighting, or “thickness”, of each branch is proportional 
to the absolute square of the probability amplitude for the state in that branch [3].  In 
order for an Observer in a universe to find the same probability of an experimental 
outcome as that determined by the branch thickness, the number of universes in a 
branch must be proportional to the branch weighting, that is, proportional to the 
absolute square of the probability amplitude for the branch. 
 
Suppose that the constant of proportionality is N, so that the number of universes in 
any branch is found by multiplying the absolute square of the probability amplitude 
for that branch by N.  So the number of universes in each of the (2) and (6) branches 
is |b1|
2
 |c1|
2
 |a2|
2
 N and |b2|
2
 |c1|
2
 |a2|
2
 N respectively.  Then, since |b1|
2
 + |b2|
2
 = 1, 
Observers in a fraction |b1|
2
 of all of the universes in these two branches will see an 
experimental outcome B1, and, in a fraction |b2|
2
, Observers will see the outcome B2.  
Of course, the quantum uncertainty experienced by the Observers arises because they 
do not know which universe they are in. 
 
It is a feature of MWI trees that the total sum of the absolute squares of its probability 
amplitudes is conserved.  To see this, note that the sum of the absolute squares of the 
probability amplitudes of the eight twigs (numbered (1) – (8) in Figure 5) is (taking 
the twigs in numerical order): 
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= 1 (because |a1|
2
 + |a2|
2
 = |b1|
2
 + |b2|
2
 = |c1|
2
 + |c2|
2
 + |c3|
2
 = 1) 
 
So long as the number of universes in every branch is proportional to the absolute 
square of the probability amplitude for that branch, the fact that the total of the 
absolute squares is constant (unity) guarantees that the total number of universes in 
the multiverse remains constant despite the branching (as it should).  Furthermore, 
since the absolute square of the probability amplitude of the beginning of the trunk of 
the tree must be unity (or it would not exist), the number of universes at that 
beginning must be N.  So, in conclusion, the number of universes in the multiverse is 
the proportionality constant that is applied to every branch, namely N. 
 
3. The number of universes in the multiverse 
It is instructive to see whether there is a lower limit to N.  We start by considering the 
number of universes needed to represent the outcomes of individual experiments.  The 
ratio of the thicknesses of the branches from an individual experiment must be the 
same as the ratios of the absolute squares of the probability amplitudes for each of the 
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possible outcomes of that experiment.  So, for example, if outcome B2 is twice as 
likely as that of B1, then |b1|
2
 must equal ⅓ and |b2|
2
 must be ⅔.  Therefore, the 
smallest number of universes that could represent this experiment alone, not 
considering any other experiment in the multiverse, is 3, with one universe allocated 
to the B1 outcome and two to the B2 outcome.  Following the nomenclature of [4], let 
us call the smallest group of parallel universes that corresponds to a particular 
experiment, a kernel.  So the kernel for the B experiment contains three universes:   
KB = 3, with one in the B1 branch (KB1 = 1), and two in the B2 branch (KB2 = 2). 
 
Taking another example, if the absolute squares of the probability amplitudes for the  
outcomes C1, C2 and C3, namely, |c1|
2
, |c2|
2
 and |c3|
2
, are 3
1
, 5
1
 and 15
7
 respectively, 
then the smallest group that reflects these probabilities has 5, 3 and 7 universes in 
these respective branches.  The pattern becomes clear: the number of universes in 
each branch of a kernel is given by multiplying the absolute square of the probability 
amplitude for each of the experimental outcomes by the lowest common denominator 
(LCD) for the probabilities of each outcome.  In this instance, the LCD is 15 and the 
numbers of universes are 3
1  
× 15 = 5, 5
1  
× 15 = 3, and 15
7  
× 15 = 7 for the respective 
outcomes.  So KC = 15 with KC1 = 5, KC2 = 3 and KC3 = 7.  We shall consider later the 
general case where the probability of an outcome cannot be expressed as a rational 
fraction. 
 
In order to preserve the proportionalities of branch thicknesses for any given 
experiment, the number of universes in the trunk of the tree has to be the product of 
the kernels of every event in the tree.  Then, proceeding upwards along the branches, 
the kernel for each experiment is divided into its components according to the relative 
thicknesses of the branches for that experiment.  Figure 6 illustrates the process. 
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Figure 6:  The smallest number of universes in any branch of the multiverse 
contains components of kernels from every branch in the multiverse. 
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From this, it is clear that the smallest possible number of universes in the multiverse, 
using the smallest possible number for each experiment (its kernel), is the product of 
the kernels of all of the experiments that take place in the multiverse.  Notice that the 
repeated appearance of the same experiment on unconnected branches does not mean 
that its kernel has to be multiplied with each appearance (so that KB appears only once 
and not four times in the products). 
In summary, then, the minimum number of universes in the multiverse, N, is given by 
the product of the kernels of all of the quantum events in the universe (which may be 
determined by inspection of diagrams like Figure 2).  This means, of course, that the 
number of universes for every event has components of kernels of events in 
completely different branches of the multiverse.  Hence, for instance, the twig 
containing outcome B1 in universe (1) includes the kernel for event C in its product 
(KA1 KB1 KC), although C occurs in a completely separate branch.  Indeed, the number 
of universes containing any quantum event in the multiverse contains components of 
the kernels for every quantum event in the multiverse. 
As we have seen, the branch kernels for the outcomes of a given experiment are in the 
same proportions to each other as those of the absolute squares of the relevant 
probability amplitudes (so, for instance, KC1 : KC2 : KC3  → |c1|
2
 : |c2|
2
 : |c3|
2
).  So none 
of the branch kernels can be infinite, because ratios of infinite quantities are not 
properly defined, whereas we can confidently verify the consistency of such ratios 
from the outcomes of multiply repeated C experiments (to within experimental error).  
This means that the complete kernel for any quantum event in the multiverse, being 
the sum of its finite branch kernels, cannot be infinite.  Therefore N, which is the 
product of all of the kernels of all of the quantum events in the multiverse, cannot be 
infinite either.  The number of universes in the multiverse is finite. 
This conclusion, that the number of universes in the multiverse is finite, is unchanged 
even if that number is not N, but a multiple of N.  It cannot be an infinite multiple, 
because that would mean, once again, expressing probabilities of infinite quantities as 
improperly defined ratios. 
Of course, quantum mechanical probabilities calculated from the Schrödinger 
equation are generally irrational, and not expressible in the convenient ratios such as 
3
1
, 5
1
 and 15
7  
that we used above.  By definition, indeed, an irrational quantity 
cannot be expressed as the ratio of two finite numbers.  However, the ratio of two 
infinite numbers is not properly defined.  Therefore, Schrödinger-generated quantum 
probabilities cannot generally emerge from a multiverse of parallel block universes. 
So, to summarise the argument so far: 
1. The Many Worlds Interpretation of quantum mechanics circumvents the 
problem of wave-function collapse. 
2. However, in turn, MWI introduces the difficulty that its topology is 
incompatible with that of the Minkowski block universe. 
3. The resolution is to populate the MWI tree with discrete parallel block 
universes in proportion to the weightings of the branches. 
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4. However, that constrains calculated quantum probabilities to rational values 
only, and it also means that the number of parallel block universes in the 
multiverse is finite, albeit unimaginably vast. 
 
4. A discrete theory 
If the above arguments are accepted, then the difficulty with the irrational 
probabilities that emerge from the Schrödinger equation can only be resolved by 
regarding conventional quantum mechanics as an approximation to a discrete, digital 
theory (in a reversal of the normal situation where digital computers are used to 
simulate real and complex quantities).  If the picture of quantum events in the MWI-
block universe model is generalized to include quantum field theories extending, 
putatively, to one for the gravitational field, then this implies that a discrete theory 
should include general relativity. 
 
If it could be shown that quantum physics or general relativity could not be replaced 
by such equivalent, discrete theories, then we should have to regard one or more steps 
in the above argument as invalid.  It turns out, however, that physicists including 
Albert Einstein, Richard Feynman and Gerard ’t Hooft among others have surmised 
that nature is fundamentally discrete [5]. 
 
Indeed, ’t Hooft describes a quantum theory based upon integers [6], and Zahedi has 
reformulated the field equations of the strong, electromagnetic and gravitational 
forces (and other equations from quantum theory) in terms of integers and matrices: 
he prefaces his paper with a nice review of work in the field [5]. 
 
5. The multiverse and its component universes are finite 
A corollary of the hypothesis that the number of parallel block universes in the 
multiverse is finite is that all of these universes must be finite in the time and spatial 
dimensions.  If any universe were infinite in either time or space, then, from simple 
unitary evolution of the Schrödinger equation (or its discrete equivalent) within that 
universe, it would contain an infinite number of quantum events.  These, in turn, 
would require an infinite number of kernels, which, from the previous discussion, 
would imply an infinite number of parallel block universes, which we have ruled out.  
A model of such a finite multiverse and its component block universes will be 
described in a subsequent paper. 
Notice that a block universe is not generally the same thing as our observable 
universe, which is spatially finite by definition.  While current data from, for instance, 
the Planck 2015 project [7] put the cosmological curvature parameter at zero to within 
half a percent (which implies a strong likelihood that the universe is infinite), some 
global topologies of the universe (such as Friedmann-Robertson-Walker models [8] 
allow the universe volume to be finite with a zero or even negative curvature [9].  So 
the above prediction that the universe is finite is not ruled out by current cosmological 
data. 
Another corollary of a finite multiverse must be that, contrary to the popular device of 
alternate-history novels (e.g., Philip K Dick’s The Man in the High Castle), the 
multiverse does not contain every conceivable universe. 
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If the premise for the Many Worlds Interpretation is accepted along with the concept 
of the block universe, then we may conclude: 
1. The number of parallel block universes in the multiverse is finite. 
2. Every universe in the multiverse is finite both in space and in time. 
3. It is not true that every conceivable universe exists in the multiverse. 
4. Quantum probabilities are never irrational. 
5. Quantum theory is an approximation to an equivalent theory which must be 
discrete (this probably includes general relativity as well). 
 
6. Testing the hypothesis 
A common response to the claim that MWI is not testable is that it is not a new theory 
but an interpretation of quantum mechanics, by which it stands or falls: every test of 
quantum mechanics is also a test of MWI.  However, some of the above conclusions 
that result from combining MWI with parallel block universes may be tested, at least 
in principle (the block universe itself is testable – see [2]). 
If, for instance, it turns out that the upper limit on the number of universes in a kernel 
is sufficiently low, then it might be possible to test the claim that quantum 
probabilities are always rational.  Imagine an experiment, Z, which has two possible 
outcomes, Z1 and Z2, with conventionally calculated quantum-mechanical 
probabilities of ~1 and 10
-25
 respectively.  The number of universes in the 
corresponding kernel components should therefore be KZ1 = 10
25
 and KZ2 = 1.  
However, suppose that a kernel cannot exceed a limit of, say, 10
20
 universes, so that 
KZ1 = 10
20
.  In that case, KZ2 might either be unity or zero, so that either the chance of 
detecting a Z2 outcome in an experiment would be a factor of 10
5
 greater than 
predicted by conventional quantum mechanics or no such outcomes would be 
detected at all.   Since experiments can be designed to detect such very low 
probabilities, a discrepancy between the measured and calculated probability would 
be evidence for the proposed hypothesis. 
Another claim that might be tested is that every universe is finite both in space and in 
time.  This claim runs counter to current cosmological thinking, as we said above, and 
so any new cosmological data to the contrary would support the hypothesis of a 
multiverse of discrete parallel block universes. 
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